For citizens of Central Asia, the Russian labor market has long remained an almost unchallenged destination. Geographic proximity, visa-free travel, knowledge of the Russian language, established diasporas, and steady demand for labor made Russia the main hub for labor migration from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. However, in recent years this model has been gradually changing. Amid tightening Russian migration policy, citizens of Central Asia are gaining more opportunities to work in other countries. One of the most notable destinations is Turkey, where an important factor is not only the attractiveness of the Turkish market but also Ankara's gradual creation of institutional conditions for labor mobility of citizens of Turkic states.
In the first half of 2026, the number of entries by citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan into Russia for employment purposes fell by about 15% compared to the same period in 2025. In the first six months of 2026, there were about 1.9 million entries versus 2.3 million a year earlier. The decline comes amid consistent tightening of Russian migration regulation. In 2025, Russia introduced a register of controlled persons, and state migration policy became more focused on controlling the presence of foreigners, compliance with migration legislation, and selective attraction of labor. At the same time, Russia itself continues to face a serious labor shortage: by estimates, the country needs more than 2 million additional workers, especially in industry, construction, and services.
For Central Asia, this trend is particularly significant. Labor migration is not only a way for individuals to earn money but also an important source of foreign currency inflows. Dependence on remittances is especially high in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, reduced employment opportunities in Russia create incentives for the region's states to seek additional markets where they can direct labor. Here, a new model is gradually emerging: Russia retains its importance, but other destinations are appearing that can absorb part of the migration flow.
One of the most interesting examples is Turkey. In 2025, citizens of Central Asia already constituted a notable share of the foreign population arriving in the country. According to Turkish statistics, the largest group among foreign citizens arriving in Turkey in 2025 were citizens of Turkmenistan—23.4% of all foreigners; followed by citizens of Uzbekistan—6.9%. These data reflect international migration in general and cannot automatically be interpreted as labor migration statistics, but they show the scale of the presence of the region's citizens in Turkey's migration space.
But more important than the migration figures themselves is the change in access rules to the Turkish labor market. In October 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a decree changing the conditions for professional activity of citizens of several Turkic states. The document applies to citizens of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and provides for the possibility of carrying out professional and entrepreneurial activities in Turkey on more favorable terms. Restrictions remain for military service and certain areas of national security. Foreigners must comply with the requirements of professional associations and current Turkish legislation.
The significance of this decision lies not only in simplifying certain procedures. It shows that Ankara is beginning to view labor mobility within the Turkic space as an independent area of cooperation. It is particularly telling that the decree came shortly after the 12th summit of the Organization of Turkic States, held on October 6–7, 2025, in Gabala, Azerbaijan. The summit was held under the slogan of regional peace and security, and the Gabala Declaration adopted at its conclusion cemented further development of cooperation among the organization's states. Thus, the decision to ease labor mobility was embedded in a broader process of institutional rapprochement among Turkic states.
This is where Turkey begins to differ from an ordinary alternative labor market. It is not just that a citizen of Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan can find work in Turkey. An institutional link is gradually being formed between the states of origin of migrants and the Turkish labor market. For example, in 2026, Uzbekistan and Turkey began developing mechanisms for organized employment of Uzbek citizens. The Uzbek Migration Agency reported agreements with the Turkish side regarding employment of citizens who have been living in Turkey for a long time, as well as the formation of mechanisms for selecting workers according to the needs of the Turkish market.
For Ankara, such a policy has a quite pragmatic explanation. The Turkish economy itself needs labor in certain sectors, so attracting foreigners can be used to compensate for labor shortages. For Central Asian countries, the benefit is also obvious: an additional market appears, especially for five states with close historical, linguistic, and cultural ties to Turkey. As a result, labor mobility is gradually turning from a largely spontaneous process into a more organized mechanism, where states can determine in advance the demanded professions, categories of workers, and channels for their employment.
Education is another important factor. Turkey has long been a popular destination for students from Central Asia. Education can become the first stage of longer-term migration: after graduating from university, foreign graduates, subject to established requirements, can use mechanisms provided by Turkish legislation for residence to search for work and further professional development. The Turkish Directorate of Migration is also developing a system of interaction with universities to simplify migration procedures for foreign students.
Thus, for the young part of Central Asia's population, Turkey potentially offers several sequential opportunities: education, temporary residence, professional activity, and further integration into the labor market. This differs from the traditional model of labor migration to Russia, which for many has been associated for decades primarily with temporary earnings and subsequent return home.
At the same time, it would be wrong to say that Central Asian citizens are massively 'leaving' Russia for Turkey. The scales of the two markets are not yet comparable. Russia has far more jobs, and migration ties between Russia and Central Asia have been formed over decades. Even the current decline in flow does not change the fact that Russia remains the most important destination for millions of workers in the region.
However, the structure of choice itself is changing. If earlier for a significant part of migrants the question was essentially whether to go to Russia, now the possibility of choosing between several destinations is gradually emerging. Kazakhstan already acts as an additional labor market within the region, and Turkey is forming its own channel for attracting workers from Turkic states. In parallel, opportunities for labor migration to South Korea, European countries, the Persian Gulf states, and other destinations are expanding.
